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Primates interpret conspecific behaviour as goal-directed and expect others
to achieve goals by the most efficient means possible. While this teleological
stance is prominent in evolutionary and developmental theories of social
cognition, little is known about the underlying mechanisms. In predictive
models of social cognition, a perceptual prediction of an ideal efficient trajec-
tory would be generated from prior knowledge against which the observed
action is evaluated, distorting the perception of unexpected inefficient
actions. To test this, participants observed an actor reach for an object
with a straight or arched trajectory on a touch screen. The actions were
made efficient or inefficient by adding or removing an obstructing object.
The action disappeared mid-trajectory and participants touched the last
seen screen position of the hand. Judgements of inefficient actions were
biased towards the efficient prediction (straight trajectories upward to
avoid the obstruction, arched trajectories downward towards the target).
These corrections increased when the obstruction’s presence/absence was
explicitly acknowledged, and when the efficient trajectory was explicitly pre-
dicted. Additional supplementary experiments demonstrated that these
biases occur during ongoing visual perception and/or immediately after
motion offset. The teleological stance is at least partly perceptual, providing
an ideal reference trajectory against which actual behaviour is evaluated.1. Introduction
Human and non-human primates take the ‘intentional stance’ when watching
conspecifics [1], interpreting their behaviour as purposeful and goal-directed
[2–6]. Crucial to this is the understanding that others’ actions are optimized
to achieve their goals in the most efficient and rational way, minimizing time
and energy expenditure, given the environmental constraints. Both human
infants and macaque monkeys, for example, show surprise when intentional
agents do not attempt to avoid an obstacle, or take an unnecessary long way
to reach their goal [5,7]. This simple efficient action heuristic can provide a foun-
dation for the development of sophisticated capacities for mentalizing and
theory of mind in adult humans (e.g. [5,8]). For example, seeing a seemingly
inefficient action (e.g. a reach straight for an object despite an obstacle in the
way) can prompt the insight that others may act according to beliefs that
differ from one’s own (i.e. they may not have seen the obstacle). Indeed,
seeing such actions captures attention [9] and alters activity in brain areas
implicated in action perception and mentalizing (e.g. [10,11]).
Yet, despite the crucial role of teleological/intentional reasoning in human
and animal social cognition, little is known about the underlying processes. The
currently dominant view sees social perception as a bottom-up ‘resonance’
of one’s own motor apparatus with others’ actions, which allows the associated
goals and internal states (sensations and emotions) to be derived (e.g. [12,13]).
Action efficiency would, in such a model, be conceptualized as a post hoc moto-
ric signal of effort or energy expenditure, which can be compared with a
reference value for this type of action (e.g. [14]). However, such models are
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2challenged by findings that children make efficiency judge-
ments for movements of biomechanically impossible actions
for which motor resonance is unlikely [15], that they can pro-
cess efficiency before acquiring competence in the seen
actions (e.g. [16,17]) or that, in adults, eye movements indi-
cate expectations of efficient action before action onset,
when such kinematic information is not yet available [18].
An alternative is that teleological reasoning might not
emerge from a ‘late’ motoric signal, but from earlier percep-
tual signals (e.g. [6]). Recent predictive coding frameworks
argue that perception in general—and social perception in
particular—is informed by prior expectations, derived from
one’s knowledge about the world and other people, and
that these expectations guide processing of the perceptual
input [19–24]. Predictive influences have been demonstrated
in a diverse range of perceptual abilities, including the per-
ception of ‘true’ colour from surrounding illumination [25],
anticipated effects of physical dynamics on motion percep-
tion [26] and three-dimensional (3D) concave/convexity
from the presumed location of light sources [27]. In a similar
way, the environment provides all the necessary information
to generate an ideal reference trajectory that a fully rational,
intentional actor would take to achieve their goal (i.e. location
of goal objects and possible obstructions), and which would
provide a comparison to immediately flag observed actions
as being efficient or not, confirming prior attributions of
goals and intentionality.
Here, we provide a first test of (i) whether human observers
make such predictions of how rational actors who are aware of
all environmental constraints efficiently traverse the given
action space, (ii) whether these predictions are realized in a
perceptual format that can serve as a reference image for the
observed action, and (iii) whether this format biases the percep-
tual representation of the observed action. We rely on the
well-established phenomenon that when a moving stimulus
suddenly disappears, participants’ estimations of its last seen
position show robust distortions towards the expected path
(i.e. representational momentum [28]), in line with the notion
that the considerable uncertainty during motion perception is
sharpened by top-down information (e.g. [29,30]), or that
predicted paths are perceptually ‘filled in’ after the sudden
offset [31]. Importantly, these distortions rely on changes to
lower-level visual representations (e.g. [32,33]), occur even
when participants are warned against them [34,35] and can
integrate higher-level information such as the physical forces
acting on the objects (e.g. momentum, friction and gravity; for
a review, see [28]) or prior action expectations [36–38].
Here, we use this paradigm to reveal the expectations of
efficient action that guide the perception of others’ actions.
In three studies, participants watched an actor reach towards
an object. The action disappeared mid-trajectory, and partici-
pants indicated the perceived disappearance point on a touch
screen. In two conditions, the actions were efficient, showing
a reach either straight towards the object or arched over an
obstacle placed in between. In two other conditions, the
actions were made inefficient by either adding an obstacle
to the path of the straight reaches (such that the actor
would knock into the obstacle) or removing the obstacle for
the arched reaches (such that the actor reached over empty
space). If others’ behaviour is perceived relative to what
would be expected under the implicit assumption of efficient
action, then the perceived kinematics should be displaced
along the trajectory that an intentional, rational actor mighttake. Unexpected inefficient actions should be ‘corrected’
towards the predicted efficient action trajectory: straight
reaches would be perceived upward if approaching an
obstacle where an avoidance movement would be predicted,
while an arched reach would be displaced downwards if
made over empty space as this energy expenditure is
unnecessary. Moreover, such distortions should be observed
spontaneously when participants passively observe these
actions, but should increase the more that attention is
drawn to the environmental constraints and the behaviour
of a rational actor. As an additional between-subjects task
manipulation, we therefore varied whether the actions were
viewed under no additional instructions (no task), or whether
participants were asked to report ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in response to
the presence of an obstacle prior to action onset (report
obstacle) or to predict whether a rational actor would ideally
have to reach ‘straight’ or ‘over’ an obstacle before the action
started (predict trajectory). Further experiments showed that
these deviations are not observed when static non-action
stimuli have to be judged in the same scenes (electronic sup-
plementary material, Experiment 1), that they generalize to
probe judgements tasks that do not require working
memory or touch screen responses (electronic supplementary
material, Experiment 2) and that they are substantially
reduced through dynamic visual noise masks that disrupt
recurrent interactions between early visual areas and
top-down information (electronic supplementary material,
Experiment 3).2. Material and methods
(a) Participants
Eighty-five participants took part (mean age ¼ 24 years, s.d. ¼
7.7, 62 females; no task: n ¼ 30, report obstacle: n ¼ 27, predict
trajectory: n ¼ 28). Seven additional participants were excluded
due to performance (see Results). All participants were
right-handed, had normal/corrected vision, were recruited
from Plymouth University and wider community, and received
course credit or payment. The study received ethical approval
from the University of Plymouth’s ethics board, in accordance
with those of the ESRC and the Declaration of Helsinki.
A priori power analyses of previous experiments investigating
similar effects with the same method ([36], Experiment 3) revealed
that a sample size of 14 is required to achieve power of 0.95.
(b) Apparatus
Stimuli were filmed with a Sony HD video camera at 50 f.p.s.
with a widescreen aspect ratio (16 : 9) and a resolution of
1920  1080 (2.1 megapixels) and edited with Adobe Photoshop.
The experiment was delivered using Presentation (NeuroBS) via
an NEC Multisync P221w LCD touch screen monitor (1680 
1050). Verbal responses for the report obstacle and predict trajec-
tory conditions were recorded using Presentation’s sound
threshold logic via a Logitech PC120 combined microphone
and headphone set.
(c) Stimuli
Example stimuli can be seen in figure 1a. Videos were filmed of
an arm starting in a rest position at the right of the screen and
reaching to grasp a target object on the left (either an apple,
bottle, crisps, glue stick or stapler). In the original set of
videos, the actor’s reach was either (i) unobstructed and the
trajectory of the arm was straight towards the target object
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Figure 1. Stimulus conditions and trial sequence. The stimulus conditions are depicted in (a). The action trajectory was either straight (i,ii) or arched over (iii,iv). The
presence or absence of an obstructing object made the action trajectory either efficient (i,iii) or inefficient (ii,iv). In all examples, the hand is in the initial start
position, and the white markers depict the final four frames of the trajectory of the index finger tip. The action sequence disappeared at one of these four points. An
example trial sequence is depicted in (b), depicting an efficient arched trajectory over an obstruction. (Online version in colour.)
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3(straight/efficient), (ii) obstructed by one of four objects (iPad,
lamp, pencil holder or photo-frame) and the trajectory of the
arm was arched over the obstruction (arched/efficient). From
each video, 19 frames were extracted for the experimental
stimuli, beginning with the onset of movement (frame 1) to
mid-way through the action (frame 19). Inefficient action
sequences were created by digitally removing the obstructing
objects in the arched/efficient videos (arched/inefficient). For
each of the straight/efficient actions, a new set of videos were
created by adding each of the obstructing objects to show the
actor was reaching straight for the target, despite the obstruction
(straight/inefficient). This created a set of inefficient actions that
were identical to the efficient actions in terms of movement kin-
ematics, and differed only by the presence/absence of the
obstructing object. Finally, for each action, a single frame was cre-
ated in which the hand was digitally removed. This served as a
response stimulus at the end of each trial where participants
estimated the disappearance point of the action.
(d) Procedure
Participants completed two blocks of 80 trials in which each com-
bination of action trajectory (straight and arched) and efficiency
(efficient and inefficient) was represented by 20 trials. Partici-
pants were instructed that, on each trial, they would see an
actor reach from the right of the screen for a target object onthe far left, but that sometimes there would be a second object
in between.
An example trial sequence can be seen in figure 1b. At the
start of each trial, participants were instructed to ‘hold the space-
bar’ and to keep it depressed to prevent them from tracking the
observed action with their finger to improve performance. They
then saw the first frame of the action sequence as a static image.
In the no task condition, the action sequence began after a ran-
domly chosen delay of between 1000 and 3000 ms. In the
report obstacle condition and predict trajectory conditions, it
began 1000 ms after the participant’s verbal response had been
detected. In the report obstacle condition, participants said ‘no’
if there was no obstruction and ‘yes’ if there was an obstruction.
In the predict trajectory condition, participants said ‘straight’ if
there was no obstruction and ‘over’ if there was an obstruction.
The action depicted the frame order progressing at three frame
intervals for a total sequence of between four and seven frames
for 80 ms each (e.g. frames 1–4–7–10–13–16–19). Starting
frames and sequence length were randomly chosen on each
trial to prevent memorization of the final position from the start-
ing frame. The final frame was immediately replaced by the
response stimulus, creating the impression that the hand
simply disappeared from the scene. Participants released the
spacebar and, with their right hand, touched the screen where
they thought the final seen position of the tip of the index
finger was. As soon as a response was registered, the next trial
no task
arched/inefficient
arched/efficient
straight/inefficient
straight/efficient
arched/inefficient
arched
arched/efficient
straight/inefficient
straight
straight/efficient
–50
50 50 50
–50 50
–50
–50 50
Y-
ax
is 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
(px
)
Y-
ax
is 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
(px
)
X-axis difference (px) X-axis difference (px)
X-axis position
Y-
ax
is 
po
sit
io
n
–50
–50 50
Y-
ax
is 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
(px
)
X-axis difference (px)
report obstacle predict trajectory
no task report
obstacle
predict
trajectory
total perceptual correction
to
ta
l v
er
tic
al
 c
or
re
ct
io
n 
of
 in
ef
fic
ie
nt
ac
tio
ns
 (p
x)
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
4500
0
125
–125
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 2. The trajectory  efficiency interactions for each task condition are depicted in (a) no task, (b) report obstacle and (c) predict trajectory. The difference
between the real final position and the selected final position is plotted for the X-axis and Y-axis. The centre of each plot represents the real final position on any
given trial (0 px difference on each axis). (d ) A descriptive representation of the data in real screen coordinates (collapsed across task conditions). The solid lines
represent the mean real final position of the arched (white) and straight (black) trajectories for the four possible disappearance points. The selected screen co-
ordinates for each trajectory are plotted for the efficient (filled line) and inefficient (dashed line) conditions. The data are placed over a spatially aligned backdrop of
a representative stimulus image of the action start point with an obstructing object to provide a reference of how the data relate to the stimuli. (e) A comparison of
the size of the Y-axis interaction in pixels, equivalent to the total amount by which inefficient actions were corrected towards a more efficient trajectory. Error bars
depict 95% confidence intervals.
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4began. Debriefing during pilot testing in the report obstacle con-
dition has established that this experimental set-up is relatively
opaque to participants and therefore unlikely to capture
demand effects (e.g. [39,40]). Participants believed the aim to be
investigating speed ofmotor responses and/or sequence learning,
but none of them mentioned action efficiency/rationality or the
hypothesized effect of perceptual mis-localizations.3. Results
Participantswere excluded if the distance between the real and
selected positions exceeded 3 s.d. of the samplemean (mean ¼
49.2 pixels, s.d. ¼ 12.4, no exclusions), or if the correlation
between the real and selected positions was more than 3 s.d.
below the median r value (X-axis: median ¼ 0.914, s.d. ¼
0.055; Y-axis: median ¼ 0.901, s.d. ¼ 0.077, four participants
excluded). For each participant, individual trials were
excluded if the response procedure was incorrect (spacebar
released before the action offset, 4.1%), or if response initiation
or execution times were less than 200 ms or more than 3 s.d.
above the sample mean (5.1%, initiation: mean ¼ 443.5 ms,
s.d. ¼ 84.4; execution: mean ¼ 817.2 ms, s.d. ¼ 230.4). Three
additional participants were excluded for having an excessive
number of trial exclusions (greater than 50%).The real final screen coordinate of the tip of the index
finger was subtracted from participants’ selected screen coor-
dinate on each trial. Analysis was conducted on this residual
localization error, which provided a directional measure of
how far, in pixels (px), participants’ responses were displaced
along theX- and Y-axes. An accurate response would produce
a value of 0 on both axes. On theX-axis, positive values denote
a rightwarddisplacement (against the direction ofmotion) and
negative values a leftward displacement. On the Y-axis, posi-
tive and negative values denote upward and downward
displacements, respectively.
Overall, there was a significant leftward bias (X-axis:
mean ¼ 28.4 px, s.d. ¼ 19.2, t84 ¼ 24.01, p, 0.001, d ¼
0.61, 95% CI (24.3, 212.5)), and a significant downward
bias (Y-axis: mean ¼ 215.1 px, s.d. ¼ 15.0, t84 ¼ 29.27, p,
0.001, d ¼ 1.35, 95% CI (211.9, 218.3)). The differences
along the X- and Y-axes and the result of the one-sample
t-test, for each experimental condition across all tasks and
for each task individually, can be seen in electronic sup-
plementary material, table S1 (figure 2a–d). These
difference values were entered into a 2  2  3 mixed-
measures ANOVA for the X- and Y-axes separately, with tra-
jectory (arched and straight) and efficiency (efficient and
inefficient) as within-subjects factors, and task (no task,
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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5report obstacle and predict trajectory) as a between-subjects
factor.
(a) Y-axis
The main prediction is that perceptual judgements of ineffi-
cient actions would be displaced towards the expected
trajectory, that is, downwards for inefficient arched trajec-
tories and upwards for inefficient straight trajectories.
Indeed, the analysis revealed a main effect of efficiency
(F1,82 ¼ 12.04, p ¼ 0.001, h2p ¼ 0:128) that was qualified by
an interaction of efficiency and trajectory (F1,82 ¼ 136.2, p,
0.001, h2p ¼ 0:624). As predicted, inefficient arched trajectories
(219.7 px) were displaced below efficient arched trajectories
(211.0 px, t84 ¼ 29.33, p, 0.001, d ¼ 0.47), and inefficient
straight actions (212.0 px) were displaced above efficient
straight actions (217.7 px, t84 ¼ 8.51, p, 0.001, d ¼ 0.44),
despite the actual hand disappearance points being identical
within each trajectory. Importantly, there was a three-way
interaction between trajectory, efficiency and task (F2,82 ¼
10.6, p, 0.001, h2p ¼ 0:205). The interaction effect was
re-quantified as a single value for each participant
((arched/efficient2 arched/inefficient) 2 (straight/
efficient 2 straight/inefficient)) to reveal the total amount in
pixels by which inefficient actions were corrected towards a
more efficient trajectory for each task (figure 2e). Between-
subjects t-tests on this interaction value—mathematically
equivalent to the pairwise three-way interactions of trajec-
tory, efficiency and task—show that the interaction was
marginally larger in the predict trajectory condition than
the report obstacle condition (t53 ¼ 21.95, p ¼ 0.057, d ¼
0.53), which in turn was significantly larger than in the no
task condition (t55 ¼ 22.81, p ¼ 0.007, d ¼ 0.73). Demonstrat-
ing the robustness of the interaction, exploratory analysis
showed that the interaction of trajectory and efficiency was
evident in all conditions with a corrected a-level of p ¼
0.017 (no task: F1,29 ¼ 35.3, p, 0.001, h2p ¼ 0:549; report
obstacle: F1,26 ¼ 44.5, p, 0.001, h2p ¼ 0:631; predict trajectory:
F1,27 ¼ 57.7, p, 0.001, h2p ¼ 0:681; figure 2a–c). There were
no further main effects or interactions.
(b) X-axis
We did not have specific predictions about how action ration-
ality would affect perceptual displacements on the X-axis,
and the analysis indeed did not reveal either a main effect
of efficiency (F1,82 ¼ 0.837, p ¼ 0.363, h2p ¼ 0:01) or an inter-
action of efficiency and trajectory (F1,82 ¼ 1.39, p ¼ 0.242,
h2p ¼ 0:017). We report the remaining effects of no interest
below, but due to a-inflation of unpredicted effects in an
ANOVA [41], they should be considered exploratory and
interpreted with caution. A main effect of task (F2,82 ¼ 8.81,
p, 0.001, h2p ¼ 0:177) revealed a general leftward displace-
ment in the no task (216.8 px, t29 ¼ 25.14, p, 0.001, d ¼
1.35) and predict trajectory conditions (210.0 px,
t27 ¼ 23.43, p ¼ 0.002. d ¼ 0.86), but not in the report
obstacle condition (9 px, t26 ¼ 0.720, p ¼ 0.478, d ¼ 0.19).
A main effect of trajectory (F1,82 ¼ 1231.4, p, 0.001,
h2p ¼ 0:938) showed a leftward displacement for arched trajec-
tories (224.4 px, t84 ¼ 211.0, p, 0.001, d ¼ 1.7) and a
rightward displacement for straight trajectories (7.7 px,
t84 ¼ 3.74, p, 0.001, d ¼ 0.53), most likely reflecting the
further right displaced centre of gravity of the straight arm
configurations ([42]; see also [36]). Finally, an interactionbetween trajectory and task (F1,82 ¼ 9.88, p, 0.001,
h2p ¼ 0:194) revealed that the trajectory effect was larger in
the no task than in the report obstacle (t55 ¼ 4.15, p, 0.001,
d ¼ 1.1) and predict trajectory conditions (t56 ¼ 3.25, p ¼
0.002, d ¼ 0.86), which did not differ from each other (t53 ¼
1.18, p ¼ 0.243, d ¼ 0.32). There were no further interactions
(all values of p. 0.351).
(c) Non-biological stationary stimuli (see electronic
supplementary material, Experiment 1)
An alternative explanation for the Y-axis interaction between
trajectory and efficiency on perceptual judgements is that the
presence of an obstacle reduced the amount of general down-
ward displacement. In electronic supplementary material,
Experiment 1 (reported in full in the electronic supplemen-
tary material), the hands were therefore replaced by a static
geometric shape in the same position as the disappearance
points of the task relevant index finger, which crucially
could not be interpreted in terms of intentionality nor effi-
ciency. However, here, the presence/absence of an obstacle
had no effect on these perceptual non-action judgements.
(d) Replication with probe judgements (see electronic
supplementary material, Experiment 2)
Electronic supplementary material, Experiment 2 (reported in
full in the electronic supplementary material) confirmed that
the perceptual shifts towards efficient actions could also be
observed in a psychophysical task without motor or working
memory components. Here, participants simply reported—
with a press of a button—whether the index finger’s seen
disappearance was identical to a probe stimulus presented
directly after action offset (250 ms gap to prevent masking),
which could be displaced either subtly upwards or down-
wards from the real disappearance point. Mirroring the
results of the main experiments, participants were more
likely to misidentify probes displaced towards the predicted
‘ideal’ trajectory with the actually perceived disappearance
point (F1,36 ¼ 11.39, p ¼ 0.002, h2p ¼ 0:240). They more readily
accepted downwards probes as the same as the last seen pos-
ition of inefficient arched reaches, and upwards probes for
inefficient straight reaches. This replication rules out that
the effects emerge from perceptual changes to the action’s
representation in later working memory or motor control
stages, and instead reveals a contribution to immediate per-
ceptual processing, either during ongoing motion
perception (e.g. [43,44]) or to perceptual ‘filling in’ in the
brief interval directly after its sudden offset (e.g. [31]).
(e) Masking with dynamic visual noise (see electronic
supplementary material, Experiment 3)
Electronic supplementary material, Experiment 3 (reported in
full in the electronic supplementary material) tested whether
the perceptual shifts towards the efficient trajectories can be
disrupted with a short (560 ms) dynamic visual noise mask
directly after action offset that was presented in 50% of
trials, at the same frequency as the prior motion stimuli
(80 ms per frame), while maintaining equivalent task
demands as the main experiment. Such masks reliably dis-
rupt lower-level perceptual processes [45,46], eliciting
similar effects to transcranial magnetic stimulation of
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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6occipital cortices (e.g. [47]). They specifically interrupt re-
entrant interactions between V1 and higher visual areas
that are crucial for conscious access to a stimulus during
actual perception (e.g. backwards masking [48,49]) or visual
imagery (e.g. [50,51]). Indeed, while the non-mask trials
fully replicated the perceptual shifts towards efficient actions,
they were reduced to about one-third of their size in the
masked trials (F1,26 ¼ 8.89, p ¼ 0.006, h2p ¼ 0:25). These mask-
ing effects therefore further confirm that the perceptual biases
in the main experiments reflect changes to early visual stimu-
lus representation, specifically tying them to the re-entrant
feedback required for stabilizing percepts in perception or
visual imagery (e.g. [48,51]).R.Soc.B
285:201806384. Discussion
The present study showed for the first time that the teleo-
logical interpretation humans have of others’ behaviour is
perceptually instantiated and provides a visual reference
signal for an expected ‘ideal’ trajectory during action obser-
vation. Participants watched a hand reach for objects with
either efficient or inefficient kinematics and reported its
last position after it had suddenly disappeared. Across sev-
eral samples, perceptual reports were consistently biased
towards the ideal reference kinematics. Straight reaches
were reported higher if there was an obstacle in the way,
as if lifted to avoid it. Conversely, reaches with a high
arched trajectory were reported lower if the path was clear.
These biases were evident automatically, but became more
pronounced when observers explicitly processed the poten-
tial obstacles that could constrain the action and
particularly when they predicted the most efficient action
kinematics through the scene.
Further experiments showed that the biases in perceptual
judgements were action-specific and not elicited when
locations of briefly presented non-biological stationary
objects were judged in the same scenes (electronic sup-
plementary material, Experiment 1). They could also be
observed in a probe judgement task without working
memory or motor components already at 250 ms after
action offset (electronic supplementary material, Experiment
2), did not increase with longer response times (electronic
supplementary material, response time (RT) analysis) and
were effectively disrupted by dynamic visual noise masks
(electronic supplementary material, Experiment 3), which
interfere with the recurrent (top-down) feedback to early
visual cortex [48], preventing its use in awareness (i.e. back-
wards masking, [46,47]) or visual imagery (e.g. [50,51]). The
observed biases in perceptual judgements are therefore unli-
kely to stem from unspecific perceptual changes in memory
or motor control (e.g. [40]; see [52] for an example for percep-
tual changes in action memory). Instead, they support a role
in ongoing motion perception (e.g. [43]) or occurring directly
after its sudden offset, when the predicted future trajectory is
visually ‘filled in’ (e.g. [31]).
The results are also unlikely to reflect the cognitive/social
demands of the experimental set-up (e.g. [39,40]). The rapid
nature of action sequences and resulting touch responses pre-
cluded considered decision-making that takes into account
the required pattern across experimental conditions. More-
over, the effect was replicated in a more complex and
cognitively opaque probe judgement task (electronicsupplementary material, Experiment 2), which is largely
unaffected by conscious strategic manipulation [34,35].
Finally, even though cues to the research question were
equivalent, the perceptual biases were successfully reduced
by brief dynamic visual noise masks directly after stimulus
offset (electronic supplementary material, Experiment 3),
which are known to disrupt perceptual processes specifically
[48,49].
Together, these results reveal that, during social
perception, the principle of efficient action provides a simi-
lar perceptual reference signal to the assumption that light
comes from above [27] or that gravity pulls objects
downwards [53], constantly pushing the perceptual rep-
resentation of inefficient actions towards a more rational
path. The resulting biases in perceptual judgements
cannot be accounted for by an abstract awareness of the
action’s goal, such as when eye movements jump towards
an action’s target [54] or perceptual judgements are biased
towards them [36–38]. Instead, they reveal concrete expec-
tations of the specific trajectory that the action will take
through the scene. Moreover, making this awareness expli-
cit prior to action observation increased the perceptual
bias. Action efficiency is therefore not only evaluated after
an action has been completed [5,7,9,55], but constantly
updated, at every step in the trajectory, by predictions
that can be derived from contextual cues prior to the
motor behaviour.
Our results support predictive coding frameworks of
social perception [19–24], which argue that social perception,
like perception in general, is hypothesis-driven and guided
by top-down expectations. In such models, observers con-
stantly test their inferences about others’ goals and beliefs
by predicting how they would behave, and matching this
prediction to—and integrating it with—the actual perceptual
input. In such a view, predictions of efficient action can con-
tribute to the perceptual sharpening of the visual uncertainty
during action perception (i.e. motion blurring, [29]), or after
its offset, constantly biasing perception towards the expected
avoidance or straightening movement, with the amount of
bias constrained by the visual uncertainty. In addition, they
allow humans to rapidly confirm the intentionality of
others’ behaviour, only requiring a match of the observed
actions to the ideal kinematics that would follow from these
goals. Prediction errors, by contrast, would signal inefficient
actions, triggering more sophisticated mentalizing processes
to re-evaluate the actor’s goal or how their beliefs may
differ from one’s own [5,10,11]. In this way, the relatively
simple perceptual process of prediction and prediction error
would not only support perception, but also provide a foun-
dation for higher-level judgements about others’ beliefs or
intentions, even in cases in which motor experience is
unlikely [15–17].
An important question is at which level the present pre-
dictive biases on social perception arise. While attribution
of goals is often seen as a higher-level process (e.g.
[19,23,24]), the detection of intentionality has been argued
to be a feature of perceptual processing itself, based on
specific stimulus features that signal intentionality and
which allow humans to ‘see’ the agency behind others’ move-
ments (for a review, see [6]). A perceptual expectation of
efficient action could emerge directly from such low-level
unconscious perceptual inferences. Indeed, a series of
follow-up studies ([56]; pre-print at: https://doi.org/10.
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Proc.R.Soc.B
285:20180638
717605/OSF.IO/QWJTF) has linked the perceptual displace-
ments to stimulus features that imply intentional action,
being almost completely eliminated for moving stimuli that
are not intentional (e.g. a ball) and do not follow the charac-
teristic motion profile of intentional action towards objects
(e.g. [57]). Such a perceptual origin is also consistent with
the finding that, in humans, sensitivity to kinematic efficiency
emerges early in development, that it is present in other
primates [7] and that it is spared in individuals with
autism spectrum conditions, for whom only more
advanced mental state reasoning proves problematic
[9,58]. The key leap to the sophisticated socio-cognitive
abilities of humans may therefore lie in the abstraction of
these lower-level content-based representations of goals,
environment and action, to higher-order representations
of desires, beliefs and intentions, respectively [5]. For
example, it is clear that human infants from the age of 4
onwards are able to predict what others will do not
based on the actual environmental constraints (toy is in
box A), but in terms of what the actor believes the state
of the environment to be (they believe it is in box B),
suggesting that the bottleneck emerges at this later state
that requires sophisticated coordination of representation,
such as others’ beliefs that differ from one’s own beliefs
or objective reality [59–61].5. Conclusion
The principle of efficient action allows observers to perceive
others’ actions relative to ideal reference actions, thereby con-
firming prior goal attributions or revising them in the case of
a conflict. Such perceptual mechanisms for efficiency percep-
tion support rapid attribution of intentionality and facilitate
the perception of others’ behaviour and our interactions
with them. The burden of social cognition is placed on
mechanisms that account for unexpected behaviour through
a re-evaluation of their beliefs, desire and intentions, so that
our model of the social world can be refined, and predictions
of other’s behaviour can be made more accurately.
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